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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOROTHY BLACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.14 724

vs.
ROBERT L. McKNIGHT,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendant-Respondant.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This Appeal raises the issue whether a new trial should
be granted to a party (appellant) who was rear-ended in a
motor vehicle collision by the respondant's motor vehicle and the
Trial Court failed to submit to the jury appellant's two
principal theories as to the cause of the collision, which were
fully substantiated by both direct and circumstantial evidence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A trial was held before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District
Judge of the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury on
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th days of June, 1976.

A general verdict was

returned by the jury finding in favor of the respondant and
against the appellant on June 4, 1976.

On June 14, 1976, appellant

moved for a new trial on the basis of the Trial Court's failure
to instruct the jury on appellant's two principal theories of the
case.

Appellant's motion for a new trial was denied by the
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Honorable G. Hal Taylor on July 19, 1976.

Thereafter, on

Auqust 9, 1976, appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal to
this co111rt.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
~&fpellant

respectfully requests this Court to grant

aPPWJ,-'lant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March S, 1970, at approximately 12:30 a.m., on u.s.

VS

s

tl in Davis County, state of Utah, a collision

G&CAlXed between a vehicle driven by the respondant and a

1N!IUicle driven by the appellant •

..a -

road conditions were dry.

(T.3)
(T. 5)

Visibility was clear
Appellant was

. .. , !1f!)l11~

. 1:JSl'Vl&.1ing en route from Brigham City with her now dee eased sister'

>f.)ftl')f'; .•

as a passenger ,

south on Highway 91, in the outside lane

of tbe highway.

(T. 4, 6)

About a quarter of a mile past

fth:i·

the Kaysville elevators appellant noticed a vehicle with flashing
red and white lights parked off to the side of the highway
in the holding lane.
".·
1

(T. 6)

Appellant believed that the vehicle

I

in the holding lane was a patrol car because of the flashing.

.1

white and red lights.

1

(T. 6) Appellant was traveling approx1mate 1

60 miles per hour at this point in time.

(T. 6)

Traffic at that!

I

time of night, on the date of the collision, was moderate.
(T. 7)

At the time of the collision, Highway 91 was divided bY

I
1i
1
I

white dividing stripe separating the southbound and

northbound~

I
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of traffic.

(T. 7)

7here were two lanes for both southbound

and northbound traffic.

(T.

7)

After appellant noticed the highway patrol car parked off
to the side of Highway 91 in a holding lane, (said patrol car was
parked in a southerly direction
appellant was traveling)

on the same side of the highway as

appellant noticed two horses walking

from the inside lane of traffic to the outside lane of the
two southerly lanes of travel on Highway 91.

(T. 8)

When

the horses were approximately in front of appellant's vehicle,
appellant slowed down and glanced in her rear view mirror.
Appellant saw no lights behind her vehicle at this time.

(T. 8).
(T. 8)

Appellant then signaled a left turn from the outside lane
to the inside lane in order not to collide with the horses and
to allow them to proceed across the highway.

(T. 8)

After the horses had proceeded across the highway,
appellant signaled for a right turn from the inside lane to the
outside lane of travel.

(T. 9)

After appellant had signaled,

and had entered the outside lane of travel, she consulted
her rear view mirror and saw headlights bearing down on her
vehicle from the rear.

(T.9)

Appellant's vehicle then was struck in the left rear section
by respondant's vehicle.

(T. 10)

The impact of the collision

was so violent that it caused appellant's vehicle to flip
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over several times causing serious and permanent personal injur)E,:
I

to plaintiff,
It was defendant-respondant' s contention at trial that the
\,.,. '
.
. ..
collision actually occurred in the inside southbound lane of
.

,:~;.:

• • '.\&'!>, ..

, --

tig)Btay 91 on the night of the collision, which contention was

fJJl>irlpir! •.·

t~~ly

supported by the eye witness testimony of the police

;.:,.r., .,_, ,·.

officer whose car was parked in the

......._:r
..a

holding lane next to the

and who witnessed intermittent movements of the appellant'!

.....,.:m.dant's vehicles prior to the collision.

(T. 24, 61,

611,

lle.spondant admitted under cross examination that he was
· ·~,. tile fourth week of working the swing shift at Hill Air Force

··· ........ ·;s a production control specialist.

I
I

(T. 68, 69, 70).

-<\:

'~nt

&Wint

also admitted under cross examination that the

shift commenced at 3:30 p.m. and continued until 12:00

p.a. at niqht.

(T. 70)

I
I

Respondant testified that he observed

a vehicle parked in the holding lane, that he noticed white tail
liqhts in the back of the car.

(T. 62, 72) •

Respondant

estimated that his speed prior to the collision was between
60 and 65 miles per hour.

(T. 73)

It was respondant' s

testimony that he was attempting to overtake appellant's
vehicle which was traveling south in the outside lane of travel
when appellant's vehicle made an abrupt turn and swerved
into respondant's lane of travel.

(T. 62)

Respondant contended'

that prior to this abrupt turn appellant gave no manual or
mechanical turn signal.

(T.

63)
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At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Court submitted all
of respondant's principal theories as to the cause of the
collision with appellant's vehicle in its Intruction No. 13 to
the jury.

The Trial Court, however, did not submit all

of appellant's principal theories as to the cause of the collision.
It was appellant's contention that respondant's vehicle was
following appellant's vehicle more closely than was reasonable
and prudent under the then existing circumstances, and that
respondant's vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed greater
than was necessary to avoid colliding with appellant's vehicle.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO SUBMIT APPELLANT'S PROPOSED
INSTRUCTIONS NO.'S 12(d) AND 13, WHICH WERE BASED UPON SECTION
41-6-62(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, TO THE JURY WAS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
Appellant assigns as error the trial courts· failure to
submit to the jury appellant's proposed instructions No.'s 12(d)
and 13, which were predicated upon Section 41-6-62{a), Utah Code
Annotated.
UTAH CODE ANN., Section 41-6-62(a)

(1954), provides:
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;
(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not
follow another vehicle more closely than is
;#easonable and prudent, having due regard
for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic
lllfOll and the condition of the highway ••••
llflellant submits that there was abundant, direct and

, Ip ••tial evidence illicited at trial sufficient to
to submit to the jury the issue embodied

and incorporated in the appellant's
Instructions No.'s 12(d) and 13.
~........._.

·•••• 5'

appellant proffered the following direct

, ..

now, why don't you pick up when
police car and tell us what happened?
Then as we proceeded down there
we noticed coming in front of us.
llow, were they large horses, Mrs. Black?

.••{llbecau.se
; A. oneYes.was

One seemed taller than the other
light and one was dark. And this is
"'1111atl made it stand out. First I saw the light horse.
•~

~

a.<'
(t,l

.

·'

Q. How did you happen to notice that
there were horses?

A.

Well,

Q.

And why was that?

I

had my lights on high.

~

A. Because -- well, there wasn't that much
traffic. And of course whenever there was a car we
would dim, but there wasnt' enough traffic on the
north bound freeway to really be a problem. So I
was driving with my lights on high.
Q. So the horses were travelling from the
inside lane to the outside lanei is that correct?
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A.

Right, going across.

Q.

Were they running or were they walking?

A. They were walking. And they were just
about in front of us proceeding on the -- on across,
so as I saw them I slowed down and glanced in my
rear view mirror. I didn't see any light behind me.
I signaled a left turn and moved out around.
And of
course the horses proceeded on across.
I signaled a right turn and backed in and almost
at this time when I glanced up I saw the lights bearing

~
Q.
Now, Mrs. Black, when you were in the
inside lane, I believe you said you signaled to make
a right hand turn to go back into the right hand lane?

A.

Right.

Q. And I believe you said you consulted your
rear view mirror. Did you have a side view mirror on
your vehicle?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you use that?

A.

No.

Q.

Why was that?

I

have a side.

A. I am not really secure with the side. I
mean I don't feel that this can see all that you need
to. And of course the time involved I just glanced up
in the rear view mirror and proceeded to make my turn.
Q.
Now, when you were in the outside
lane originally and you made your left hand tu:n
to the inside lane, did you ever see any headlights?
Did you ever see any vehicle behind you?

A.

No, sir, not at any time.

Q
And after you were in the inside lane
and the horses had passed you and you th~n signaled t<;>
go in the outside lane, did you ever notice any headlights
in the mirror?
0
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A. After I proceeded around in this manner
in coming back in, and as I looked up I saw headlights
bearing down.
Q.

O.K.

A.

From the rear.

Q.

What happened next, Mrs. Black?

A.

Well, we were struck on the left, or the left side,

Q.

So his right front struck your car?

J\i-

Struck the left.

Q.

Left rear of your car?

A.

Right.

,e,,
t· ,.

II

(T. 8, 9, 10)

submits the fact that the respondant' s vehicle

'with the rear end of appellant's vehicle is

In addition, respondant •,s own direct testimony was

hers?
,

Q.

"Then what happened?

A.

We collided.

Q.

And what portion of your car with what portion of

"

A. Well, I'd judge about 14 to 18 inches of
tlle front right bumper on my car hit approximately
maybe the same area on the left rear bumper of
her car." (T. 63)
Appellant contends that the direct testimony of the appellant
and the uncontroverted fact that appellant was rear-ended by

-8-
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respondant's vehicle was sufficient evidence to compel
the trial court to submit appellant's proposed jury instructions
No.'s 12(d) and 13, which were predicated upon Section 41-6-62(a),
Utah Code Annotated.

The Jury should have been required to decide

whether the respondant was following appellant's motor vehicle
more closely than was reasonable and prudent under the existing
circumstances, and failure by the trial court to do so, constituted
prejudicial error.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE '.ID SUBMIT APPELLANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 WHICH WAS PREDICATED UPON 41-6-46(a),
Utah Code Annotated, WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Appellant assigns as error the trial court's failure to
submit proposed instruction No. 14 which was predicated upon
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-46(a) (1954) to the jury.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-46(a) (1954), provides:
No person shall drive a vehicle on a ·
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing.
In every event speed shall be
so controlled as may be necessary to avoid
colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance
with legal requirements and the duty of all persons
to use due care.
The trial court, however, chose to give only the ~
sentence of

Section 41-6-46 (a), in its Instruction No. 19

to the jury.
Appellant submits there was no logical reason for the
trial
court
to Law
bifurcate
thefor digitization
"speed"provided
statute
in its
Instruction
Sponsored
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No. 19 to the jury.

Appellant contends that the second

sentence of Section 41-6-46(a), Utah Code Annotated,
'(•) 0-

incorporates the holding in Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy

Prod!:£!!.~

elarJ:~;

Co., 80 U. 331, 15 P.2d 309 (1932) •

•1,r-

In the Dalley case this court said:
In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established
that it is negligence as a matter of law for a person
to drive an automobile upon a travelled public highway,
used by vehicles and pedestrians (sic) at such a rate
of speed that said automobile cannot be stopped within
tbe distance at which the operator of said car is
lllale to see objects upon the highway· in front of him.
I W. at 336J 15 P.2d at 310.

al.so, in O'Brien v. Alston,

61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791 (1923),
i

tllis Court quoted from Serfus v. Lehi, etc., Ry. co., 270

~·ltf1 113 A. 370, the following:
f\1'-.1•

lI)t is the duty of a chauffer traveling by
night to have such a headlight as is will enable him
to see in advance the face of the highway and to
discover grade crossings, or other obstacles in his
path, in time for his own safety, and to keep such
control of his car as will enable him to stop and
avoid obstructions that fall within his vision.
(emphasis added.)
The net effect of the second sentence of Utah Code Annotat~

Section 41-6-46 (a)1is to add the additional speed requirement
that "speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to
avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance,
on or entering the highway •••• " which is in conformity with the

-10-
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Dalley and O'Brien cases.
Appellant agrees for the sake of this issue on appeal,
that respondant was traveling between 60 miles per hour
and 65 miles per hour immediately prior to the accident
which is in conformity with respondant's testimony proffered
at trial.

(See T. 62 )

Appellant likewise concedes

that the posted maximum speed limit along highway 91 on the
date of the collision was 70 miles per hour.

Therefore,

Appellant submits that with these facts taken into consideration,
in addition to the facts that it was late at night on a
relatively deserted highway: an extremely hazardous
situation existed on an unlighted highway: a Utah Highway
patrol car stopped off to the side of the highway in a holding
lane: its red lights flashing for all passing motorists to
observe: that respondant was, if he had been at all observant,
forewarned that there was a potentially hazardous situation
existing on that particular portion of the highway at that
particular time which should have caused him to slow and become
acutely aware of the danger.

It was proper for the trial

court to submit sentence No. 1 of Section 41-6-46(a),
Utah Code Annotated, to the jury in light of respondant's
resultant collision with the rear end of appellant's motor
vehicle.
However, a critical part of that statute is likewise
directed to the exact type of circumstance that occurred
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-11- OCR, may contain errors.

in this case.

It was appellant's theory that respondant

did not properly or reasonably control his speed under the
existing conditions so as to avoid colliding with
tlle appellant's vehicle while he was upon the highway

fxQJl .tbe niqht of the collision.

the fact that

ft

resp~ndant's

This was true, notwithstanding

vehicle was argueably traveling

1-s than the lawful speed limit at the time of the collision.
Jq>pellant suggests to this Honorable court that it

-

-

only error for the trial court to refuse to instruct

tllle jury on the second sentence of

Section 41-6-46(a), Utah

Coo

Aall., in this case, but that in light of the uncontroverted fact

...-.~.~espondant collided with the rear end of appellant's
l:'rl.i ~le

(an eventuality which is precisely dealt with in the

seoond sentence of Section 41-6-46 (a), Utah Code Ann., and whict
~.

;... an

eventuality that suggests negligence on behalf of an

offendinq motorist) and appellant's theory that the collision
was proximately caused by respondant's failure to heed an
officer's warning, (flashing red and white lights) and
thereafter to fail to so control his speed, so as to
avoid this type of collision, that it deprived the jury
of appellant's principal theory of respondant's negligence
which was amply supported by direct and circumstantial
testimony and uncontroverted facts which should require this
court to grant appellant's 11K>tion for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
The instant case presents a fairly simple form of error
on the part of the Trial Court.

The Court simply did not

instruct the jury on two key issues submitted by appellant
as to the cause of collision between appellant's and respondant' s
vehicles.

The two issues were: (1) whether or not respondant's

motor vehicle followed appellant's motor vehicle more closely
than was reasonable and prudent under the existing circumstances
and (2) whether the second sentence of Section 41-6-46(a}

de~ling

with speed causing the collision; should have been submitted to the
Jury.

The failure of the Trial Court to submit the said

issues deprived appellant of submitting her principal theories
of the collision to the jury after the same were fully and
adequately supported and corroberated by direct and circumstantial
evidence.
The absence of instructions on these two critical issues
left the jury uninformed on the law relative to appellant's
theories which were adequately supported by the evidence, to
respondant's negligence pertaining to the collision with
appellant's vehicle.

A new trial is therefore essential to

avoid possible injustice as prejudicial error clearly resulted
in failing to instruct the jury on appellant's principal
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theories of the cause of the collision.

Respectfully submitted,

of ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
136 South Main Street
Suite 404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

-14-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that I filed ten (10) copies of Appellant's

Brief with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and mailed two

(2) copies to:
Lou E. Midgley
574 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
AttoLney for Defendant-respondant
this ~'-~- day of November, 1976.
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